Consolidated Freightways v. Nova Mud Corporation : Unknown by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Consolidated Freightways v. Nova Mud
Corporation : Unknown
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Leslie Van Frank; Attorney for Respondent.
Peter Guyon; Attorney for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Consolidated Freightways v. Nova Mud Corporation, No. 890634 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2290
BRUCE G. COHNE 
RICHARD A. RAPPAPORT 
ROGER G.SEGAL 
JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI 
WILLIAM B.WRAY, JR. 
DAVID S.DOLOWTTZ 
VERNON L. HOPKINSON 
JOHN T.MORGAN 
KEITH W.MEADE 
RAY M. BECK 
MICHAELS. EVANS 
JULIE A BRYAN 
MARTHA S. STONEBROOK 
CLAIRE G. ZANOLU 
LESLIE VAN FRANK 
M. JOY DOUGLAS 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
A Professional Corporation 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
525 EAST FIRST SOUTH 
FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
Mailing Address 
POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
84147-0008 
"JUL 1 7 1990 
C O U R T O F Telecopier(801)355-1813 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
OFCOUNSEL 
JOHN MASON 
Ms. Mary N. Noonan 
Court of Appeals Clerk 
230 South 500 East 
#400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
July 17, 1990 





Re: Consolidated Freightways (Plaintiff/Respondent) 
vs. Nova Mud Corporation (Defendant /Appellant) 
Case No. : 89-0634-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
In accordance with Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, I am advising the court of a significant decision that 
was made recently by the United State Supreme Court in the case 
of Maislin Industries vs. Primary Steel, Inc. . 58 U. S. L. W. 4862 
(June 21, 1990). This case pertains to the points made by 
Appellant at pages 24 through 28 of its Brief and by Respondent 
at pages 9 through 14 and 21 through 30 of its Brief. A copy of 
the Maislin case is attached for the court' s convenience. 
Very truly yours, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT^ SEGAL, P. C. 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorney for Respondent 
LVF: cp 
cc: Peter Guyon 
Attorney for appellant 
(w/encl. ) 
f:\cp\noonan. Iet 
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Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment, but not in 
its opinion. 
CHARLES A. PALMER, Texas Assistant Attorney General (JIM 
MATTOX, Atty. Gen., MARY F. KELLER, First Asst. Atty. Gen., 
S. MICHAEL BOZARTH, Asst. Attv. Gen., and MICHAEL P. 
HODGE, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the briefs) for petitioner; JON R. 
FARRAR, Huntsville, Texas for respondent. 
No. 89-624 
MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S., INC., ET AL., PETITION-
ERS u PRIMARY STEEL, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
Isyllabus 
No. 89-624. Argued April 16, 1990-Decided June 21, 1990 
The Interstate Commerce Act (Act) requires motor common carriers to 
publish their rates in tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC), 49 U. S. C. § 10762, and prohibits both carriers and shippers 
from deviating from those rates, § 10761. The Act also specifies that a 
carrier's rates must be nondiscriminatory, § 10741, and that its rates and 
practices must be reasonable, § 10701, and charges the ICC, upon deter-
mining that a rate or practice violates the statute, with prescribing the 
rate or practice to be followed, § 10704(b)(1). Purportedly pursuant to 
this authority, the ICC, in its recent Negotiated Rates decisions, has 
adopted a policy that relieves a shipper of the obligation to pay the filed 
rate when it has privately negotiated a lower rate with the carrier. 
From 1981 to 1983, Quinn Freight Lines, a motor common carrier and a 
subsidiary of petitioner Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc., privately negoti-
ated interstate shipment rates with respondent Primary Steel, Inc., that 
were lower than Quinn's filed rates. Quinn never filed the negotiated 
rates with the ICC. In 1983, Maislin filed for bankruptcy, and the bank-
rupt estate issued balance due bills to Primary for the difference be-
tween the filed rates and the negotiated rates. When Primary refused 
to pay the undercharges, the estate brought suit in the District Court, 
which referred the matter to the ICC. Rejecting the argument that it 
lacked the statutory power to release a shipper from liability for such 
undercharges, the ICC relied on its Negotiated Rates policy to hold that 
§ 10701 authorized it to consider all the circumstances surrounding an un-
dercharge suit to determine whether collection of the filed rate would 
constitute an unreasonable practice. The ICC concluded that Maislin 
was not entitled to recover, since Quinn and Primary had negotiated 
other rates, and since Primary had relied on Quinn to file those rates, 
had reasonably believed that the amounts quoted and billed were the 
correct total charges, and had made full payment. The case returned to 
the District Court, which granted summary judgment for Primary on the 
basis of the ICC's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing 
with the District Court that the approach taken by the ICC was consists 
ent with the Act. 
Held: The ICC's Negotiated Rates policy is inconsistent with the Act and 
is therefore invalid. 
(a) Since the duty to file rates under § 10762 and the obligation to 
charge only those rates under § 10761 have always been considered es-
sential to preventing price discrimination violative of § 10741, Arizona 
Grocery Co. v. Alchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384, this 
Court has long held that the filed rate alone governs the legal rights of a 
shipper against a carrier, see, e. g., Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern 
R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163, and that the statute forbids equitable de-
fenses to collection of the filed tariff, see, e. g., Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. 
Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 245, including the shipper's ignorance or the carri-
er's misquotation of rates, see, e. g., Louisville <£ Nashville R. Co. v. 
Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97. Despite its sometimes harsh effects, this 
rigid "filed rate doctrine" has been strictly applied and consistently ad-
hered to by the Court. See, e. g., Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jor-
dan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U. S. 533, 535. 
(b) Although, under the filed rate doctrine, the tariff rate is not en-
forceable if the ICC finds it to be unreasonable, see, e. g., Maxwell, 
supra, at 97, that exception is not applicable here. The ICC's deter-
mination that a carrier engages in an "unreasonable practice" when it at-
tempts to collect the filed rate after the parties have negotiated a lower 
rate is not entitled to deference, since it conflicts with this Court's inter-
pretation, from which Congress has not diverged, that the secret negoti-
ation and collection of rates lower than the filed rate is discriminatory 
under § 10741. See, e. g., Avmmir Packing Co. v. United States, 209 
U. S. 56, 81. Stripped of its semantic cover, the Negotiated Rates pol-
icy and, more specifically, the ICC's interpretation of "unreasonable 
practices," thus stand revealed as flatly inconsistent with the Act's 
scheme as a whole and §§ 10761 and 10762 in particular. Nor can the 
ICC's policy be justified on the ground that it prevents the carrier from 
receiving a windfall, i.e., the higher filed rate, from its failure to comply 
with § 10762's directive to file the negotiated rate, since such "equities" 
are irrelevant to the application of § 10761, which requires the carrier to 
collect the filed rate. Compliance with §§ 10761 and 10762 is utterly cen-
tral to the administration of the Act, and, by sanctioning adherence to 
unfiled rates, the Negotiated Rates policy effectively renders those sec-
tions nugatory and conflicts directly with the Act's core purposes. 
(c) The passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA)—which sub-
stantially deregulated the motor carrier industry for the avowed purpose 
of promoting competitive and efficient transportation services—does not 
justify the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy. Although the ICC has both 
the authdrity and the expertise generally to adopt new policies when 
faced with new developments in the industry, its power does not extend 
to a policy that directly conflicts with its governing statute. Nothing in 
the MCA repeals §§ 10761 and 10762, and generalized congressional ex-
hortations to "increase competition" cannot provide the ICC authority to 
alter the requirements of those sections as interpreted by this Court. 
Cf. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Traffic Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 
409, 420. The fact that, even before the MCA's passage, Congress had 
allowed the ICC to exempt motor contmct carriers from the requirement 
that they adhere to the published tariff, see § 10761(b), demonstrates 
that Congress is aware of the requirement and has deliberately chosen 
not to disturb it with respect to motor common carriers. 
879 F. 2d 400, reversed and remanded. 
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, 
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. 
SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Under the Interstate Commerce Act (Act), 49 U. S. C. 
§ 10101 et seq. (1982 ed.), motor common carriers must file 
their rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC 
or Commission), and both carriers and shippers must adhere 
to these rates. This case requires us to determine the valid-
ity of a policy recently adopted by the ICC that relieves a 
shipper of the obligation of paying the filed rate when the 
shipper and carrier have privately negotiated a lower rate. 
We hold that this policy is inconsistent with the Act. 
I 
A 
The ICC regulates interstate transportation by motor com-
mon carriers to ensure that rates are both reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory. See 49 U. S. C. §§ 10101(a), 10701(a) 
10741(b) (1982 ed.). The Act provides that a "common car-
rier . . . may not subject a person, place, port, or type of traf-
fic to unreasonable discrimination." § 10741. In addition, 
the Act states that "fa] rate . . . , classification, rule, or prac-
tice related to transportation or service . . . must be reason-
able." § 10701(a).1. The ICC has primary responsibility for 
determining whether a rate or practice is reasonable. See 
Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 
426, 440-442 (1907). Thfe Commission may investigate the 
reasonableness of a rate "on its own initiative or on com-
plaint." § 11701(a). When the Commission determines that 
a rate or practice violates the statute, it "shall prescribe the 
rate . . . or practice to be followed." § 10704(b)(1). More-
over, motor common carriers are liable "for damages result-
1
 The Act states that when reviewing the reasonableness of a carrier's 
rates, the Commission "shall authorize revenue levels that are adequate 
under honest, economical, and efficient management to cover total operat-
ing expenses . . . plus a reasonable profit." 49 U. S. C. § 10701(e) (1982 
ed.) [footnote omitted]. 
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ing from the imposition.of rates for transportation or service 
the Commission finds to be in violation" of the Act. 49 
U. S. C. § 11705(b)(3) (1982 ed., Supp. V). 
The Act requires a motor common carrier to "publish and 
file with the Commission tariffs containing the rates for 
transportation it may provide." 49 U. S. C. § 10762(a)(1) 
(1982 ed.). The Act also specifically prohibits a carrier from 
providing services at any rate other than the filed (also 
known as tariff) rate: 
"Except as provided in this subtitle, a carrier provid-
ing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . shall pro-
vide that transportation or service only if the rate for the 
transportation or service is contained in a tariff that is in 
effect under this subchapter. That carrier may not 
charge or receiv^ a different compensation for that 
transportation orTservice than the rate specified in the 
tariff whether by returning a part of that rate to a per-
son, giving a person a privilege, allowing the use of a 
facility that affects the value of that transportation or 
service, or another device." § 10761(a). 
Deviation from the filed rate may result in the imposition of 
civil or criminal sanctions on the carrier or shipper. See 
§§11902-11904.2 
As the Court has frequently stated, the statute does not 
permit either a shipper's ignorance or the carrier's misquota-
tion of the applicable rate to serve as a defense to the collec-
tion of the filed rate. See SoutJiem Pacific Transp. Co. v. 
Commercial Metals Co., 456 U. S. 336, 352 (1982); Louisville 
& Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915). In 
1986, however, the ICC concluded that changes in the motor 
carrier industry "clearly warrant a tempering of the former 
harsh rule of adhering to the tariff rate in virtually all cases." 
NITL—Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated 
Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99, 106 (1986) 
(Negotiated Rates I). Under the new policy, when cases are 
referred to the Commission, it "decid[es] if the collection of 
undercharges would be an unreasonable practice." Id., at 
100. 
In Negotiated Rates I, the Commission adverted to a grow-
ing trend in the motor carrier industry whereby carriers and 
shippers negotiate rates lower than those on file with the 
ICC and the shippers are billed for and remit payment at the 
negotiated rate. In many instances, however, the negoti-
ated rate is never filed with the ICC. In some of those 
cases, the carrier subsequently files for bankruptcy and the 
trustee bills the shipper for the difference between the tariff 
rate and the negotiated rate, arguing that § 10761 compels 
the collection of the filed rather than negotiated rate. Id., at 
99. The Commission concluded that, under such circum-
stances, "it could be fundamentally unfair not to consider a 
shipper's equitable defenses to a claim for undercharges." 
Id., at 103. The Commission reasoned that the passage of 
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which significantly deregu-
lated the motor carrier industry, justified the change in 
policy, for the new competitive atmosphere made strict appli-
cation of §10761 unnecessary to deter discrimination. 3 
I. C. C. 2d, at 106. Moreover, the Commission asserted 
1
 Section 11902 provides that a shipper who knowingly receives a rebate 
or offset against the filed rate is liable to the government for a civil penalty 
in an amount equal to three times the rebate. See §11902. Section 
11903(a) states that any person who "knowingly offers, grants, gives, solic-
its, accepts, or receives" service at less than the filed rate "shall be fined at 
least $1,000 but not more than $20,000, imprisoned for not more than 2 
years, or both." A carrier who willfully fails to file and publish its tariffs is 
subject to the same penalty. See § 11903(b); see also § 11904 (corporate 
liability). 
that it had authority under § 10701 to determine whether the 
collection of the undercharge in a particular case would con-
stitute an unreasonable practice. Id., at 103.' 
The ICC clarified its new policy in NITL—Petition to Insti-
tute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier 
Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623 (1989) (Negotiated Rates II). The 
Commission explained that its policy did not recognize "eq-
uitable defenses" but rather applied the "affirmative statu-
tory requirement] and obligatio[n]" of § 10701 that a carrier's 
practices be reasonable. Id., at 631, n. 18.4 "[T]he Com-
mission is finding to be an unreasonable practice . . . a course 
of conduct consisting of: (1) negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to 
a rate that the shipper reasonably relies upon as being law-
fully filed; (3) failing, either willfully or otherwise, to publish 
the rate; (4) billing and accepting payment at the negotiated 
rate for (sometimes) numerous shipments; and (5) then de-
manding additional payment at higher rates." Id., at 628, 
n. 11. 
B 
This case involves the application of the Commission's new 
Negotiated Rates policy. It arises from an action by peti-
tioner Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. (Maislin), to recover 
freight undercharges for 1,081 interstate shipments per-
formed for a shipper, respondent Primary Steel (Primary), 
by petitioner's subsidiary, Quinn Freight Lines (Quinn). 
From 1981 to 1983, Quinn, a motor common carrier certifi-
cated by the ICC, privately negotiated rates with Primary 
that were lower than Quinn's rates then on file with the ICC. 
Quinn never filed the negotiated rates with the ICC. 
In 1983, Maislin filed for bankruptcy, and a postpetition 
audit of its accounts revealed undercharges of $187,923.36 re-
sulting from billing Primary at the negotiated rather than 
filed rates. The agents of the bankrupt estate, pursuant to 
the authorization of the bankruptcy court, issued balance due 
bills to Primary for these undercharges. When Primary re-
fused to pay the amounts demanded, the estate brought suit 
in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Missouri under 49 U. S. C. § 11706(a) (1982 ed.)s for the 
difference between the filed rates and the negotiated rates. 
In its answer, Primary alleged that since the parties had 
negotiated lower rates, rebilling at the tariff rates would con-
stitute an unreasonable practice in violation of § 10701; that 
the tariff rates themselves were not '"reasonable" within the 
meaning of § 10701; and that the asserted tariff rates were 
'The Commission stated that its new policy did not "abrogate Section 
10761. Rather we emphasize that carriers must continue to charge the 
tariff rate as provided in the statute. The issue here is simply whether 
we have the authority to consider all the circumstances surrounding an un-
dercharge suit." NITL—Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated 
Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99, 103 (1986) (citations omit-
ted). The Commission rejected a proposal by the National Industrial 
Transportation League (NITL) that would have declared the negotiated 
rate to be the maximum reasonable rate. The Commission concluded that 
the proposal conflicted with § 10761 because it created a "per se determina-
tion that, as a matter of law, the negotiated rate would apply." Id., at 
102. 
* The Commission stated: "[Ojur Negotiated Rates policy doec not. epre-
sent a relaxed interpretation of § 10761, but rather a separate determina-
tion under § 10701. But even if it were viewed as a reinterpretation of a 
previously strict construction of § 10761, it would be . . . well within tMs 
agency's authority (and indeed duty) to reinterpret the Interstate Com-
merce Act, based on upon experience gained and changing circumstances." 
NITL—Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common 
Carrier Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623, 631 (1989) (citing American Trucking 
Assn., Inc. v. Atchison- T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967)). 
•Section 11706(a) provides: 
"A common carrier providing transportation or service subject to the ji 
risdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . must begin a civ 
action to recover charges for transportation or service provided by the ca 
rier within 3 years after the claim accrues." 
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otherwise inapplicable to the shipments at issue. The Dis-
trict Court, finding these matters to be within the primary 
jurisdiction of the ICC, stayed the proceeding at Primary's 
request and referred the case to the Commission. App. 6-8. 
The ICC ruled in Primary's favor, rejecting Maislin's argu-
ment that the Commission lacked the statutory power to 
release a shipper from liability for such undercharges. Rely-
ing on Negotiated Rates I, the ICC reiterated that § 10701 au-
thorized it to "consider all the circumstances surrounding an 
undercharge suit" to determine whether collection of the filed 
rate would constitute an unreasonable practice. App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 35a. In the Commission's view, its role was 
"to undertake an analysis of whether a negotiated but unpub-
lished rate existed, the circumstances surrounding assess-
ment of the tariff rate, and any other pertinent facts." Id., 
at 36a. With respect to the instant controversy, the ICC 
concluded that Quinn and Bt-imary had negotiated rates other 
than the tariff rates* and that Primary had relied on Quinn to 
file the rates with the ICC.T "Primary reasonably believed 
that the amounts quoted and billed by Quinn were the correct 
total charges for the transportation services it performed, 
that the amounts were reached as the result of negotiations 
between Primary and Quinn, and that, since full payment 
was made by [Primary]," Maislin was not entitled to recover 
the filed rates. Id., at 43a. 
The case returned to the District Court where both parties 
moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary 
judgment for Primary, rejecting Maislin's argument that the 
ICC's new policy was, in effect, an impermissible recognition 
of equitable defenses to the application of the filed rate. The 
District Court concluded that the ICC's policy of determining 
case by case whether the collection of undercharges would be 
an unreasonable practice under § 10701 was based on a per-
missible construction of the Act. 705 F. Supp. 1401, 
1405-1406 (1988). The court also determined that the ICC's 
finding that Maislin had engaged in an unreasonable practice 
was supported by substantial evidence. Id., at 1406-1407. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, 
agreeing that the approach taken by the ICC was consistent 
with the Act. The court reasoned that "[s]ection 10761(a), 
which mandates the collection of tariff rates, is only part of 
an overall regulatory scheme administered by the ICC, and 
there is no provision in the [Act] elevating this section over 
section 10701, which requires that tariff rates be reasonable." 
879 F. 2d 400, 405 (1989). The court concluded: "[T]he 
' See App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a-38a. The Commission relied primarily 
on two "rate sheets" to find that negotiated rates existed. According to 
the Commission, a three-page rate sheet prepared by Primary in 1981 dem-
onstrated that Quinn, through its agent James McGowan, had negotiated a 
five percent across-the-board increase in rates above those in Quint's tariff 
on file with the ICC. Sometime in 1982, when Primary notified Quinn that 
it would need relief, from the rates in order to continue using Quinn, the 
parties orally negotiated a decrease in the rates. Primary prepared a new 
rate sheet which was sent to all the relevant individuals. Subsequently, 
whenever rates were needed for destinations other than those shown on 
the rate sheet, McGowan would set a new ra:e based on the mileage in-
volved. The ICC concluded that "there is evidence of offers, acceptances, 
and approvals by the involved parties" before each of the shipments in 
question. Id., at 36a; see also id. at 38a. 
T
 See id., at 43a. This finding was based on the fact that McGowan rep-
resented that his superiors had approved the rates on the written rate 
sheets. See id., at 40a. The Commission noted that Primary's represent-
ative was never given an actual tariff documenting that the agreed upon 
rates had been filed with ICC and that Primary's representative had no 
training with respect to tariffs, but the Commission concluded that the rep-
resentative "understood that Quinn would do whatever was necessary to 
implement the agreed upon rates." Id., at 32a. The Commission specifi-
cally found that "[wjhile Quinn may not have taken appropriate steps to 
legalize the quoted rates, it has not been demonstrated that this occurred 
as a result of any intent to engage in unlawful conduct." Id., at 42a. 
proper authority to harmonize these competing provisions is 
the ICC. . . . The approach taken by the ICC does not abolish 
the filed rate doctrine, but merely allows the ICC to consider 
all of the circumstances, including equitable defenses, to de-
termine if strict adhei^ ence to the filed rate doctrine would 
constitute an unreasonable practice." Ibid, (citation omit-
ted). Because the Courts of Appeals have disagreed on the 
important issue of whether the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy 
is consistent with the Act,6 we granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 
(1990). 
II 
The Interstate Commerce Act requires a motor common 
carrier to publish its rates in a tariff filed with the Commis-
sion. 49 U. S. C. §10762 (1982 ed.). This Court has long 
understood that the filed rate governs the legal relation-
ship between shipper and carrier. In Keogh v. Chicago <£ 
N&rthwe&tern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163 (1922), the Court 
explained: 
"The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect 
to a rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless 
and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all 
purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper. 
The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or 
enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier. .. . . 
This stringent rule prevails, because otherwise the para-
mount purpose of Congress—prevention of unjust dis-
crimination—might be defeated." (Citations omitted.) 
See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 
476 U. S. 409, 415-417 (1986); Abilene Cotton Oil, 204 U. S., 
at 439; Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 245 
(1906); Gulf, C. •& S. F. R. Co v. Hefiey, 158 U. S. 98, 101 
(1895). The duty to file rates with the Commission, see 
§10762, and the obligation to charge only those rates, see 
§ 10761, have always been considered essential to preventing 
price discrimination and stabilizing rates. "In order to ren-
der rates definite and certain, and to prevent discrimination 
and other abuses, the statute require[s] the filing and pub-
lishing of tariffs specifying the rates adopted by the carrier, 
and ma[kes] these the legal rates, that is, those which mus: 
be charged to all shippers alike." Arizona Grocery Co. v. 
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384 (1932). 
Given the close interplay between the duties imposed by 
§§10761-10762 and the statutory prohibition on discrimina-
tion, see §10741, this Court has read the statute to create 
strict filed rate requirements and to forbid equitable defenses 
to collection of the filed tariff. See Mugg, supra, at 245; 
Hefiey, supra, at 101. The classic statement of the "filed 
rate doctrine," as it has come to be known, is explained in 
Louis-uille & Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94 
(1915). In that case, the Court held that a passenger who 
purchased a train ticket at a rate misquoted by the ticket 
agent did not have a defense against the subsequent collec-
tion of the higher tariff rate by the railroad. 
"
 4l
 Jnder the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the 
carrier duly filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation 
from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and 
travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as well 
as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found by the 
Commission to be unreasonable. Ignorance or misquo-
* Compare In re Caravan Refrigemted Cargo, Inc. (Supreme Beef Pro-
cessors), 864 F. 2d 388 (CA5 1989), with Delta Tmmc Seivice v. Tmnstop, 
F. 2d (CM 1990); Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith 
Electronic Corp., 899 F. 2d 642 (CAT 1990); West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. 
v. Weyerhaeuser, Co., 893 F. 2d 1016 (CA9 1990); Delta Traffic Service cc 
Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. Appco Paper & Plastics Corp., 893 F. 2d 
472 (CA2 1990). 
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tation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging 
either less or more than the rate filed. This rule is un-
deniably strict and it obviously may work hardship in 
some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been 
adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate com-
merce in order to prevent unjust discrimination." Id., 
at 97.9 
This rigid approach was deemed necessary to prevent carri-
ers from intentionally "misquoting" rates to shippers as a 
means of offering them rebates or discounts. See S. Rep. 
No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 181, 188-190, 198-200 (1886). 
As the Commission itself found, "past experience shows that 
billing clerks and other agents of carriers might easily be-
come experts in the making of errors and mistakes in the quo-
tation of rates to favored shippers, while other shippers, less 
fortunate in their relations with carriers and whose traffic is 
less important, would*be compelled to pay the higher pub-
lished rates." Poor v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 12 I. C. C. 
418, 421 Grain Co. (1907); see also Western Transp. Co. v. 
Wilson & Co., 682 F. 2d 1227, 1230-1231 (CA7 1982). De-
spite the harsh effects of the filed rate doctrine, we have con-
sistently adhered to it. See, e. g., Thurston Motor Lines, 
Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U. S. 533, 535 (1983); 
Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 456 U. S., at 343-344; Bal-
dtvin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 484-485 
(1939); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal 
Co., 265 U. S. 59, 65 (1924). 
The filed rate doctrine, however, contains an important ca-
veat: the filed rate is not enforceable if the ICC finds the rate 
to be unreasonable. See Maxwell, supra, at 97 (filed rate 
applies "unless it is found by the Commission to be unrea-
sonable'^ (emphasis added); see also Keogh, 260 U. S., at 163 
("The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a 
rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless and until 
suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all purposes, the 
legal rate") (emphasis added). The filed rate doctrine, 
therefore, follows from the requirement that only filed rates 
be collected, as commanded by §§10761 and 10762, the re-
quirement that rates not be discriminatory, see 49 U. S. C. 
§10741, and the requirement of §10701 that carriers adopt 
reasonable rates and practices. As we explained in Arizona 
Grocery, supra, although the filed rate is the legal rate, the 
Act 
"did not abrogate, but [rather] expressly affirmed, the 
common-law duty to charge no more than a reasonable 
rate . . . . In other words, the legal rate was not made 
by the statute a lawful rate—it was lawful only if it was 
reasonable. Under [the Act] the shipper was bound to 
pay the legal rate; but if he could show that it was unrea-
sonable he might recover reparation. 
"The Act altered the common law by lodging in the 
Commission the power theretofore exercised by courts, 
of determining the reasonableness of a published rate. 
If the finding on this question was against the carrier, 
reparation was to be awarded the shipper, and only the 
enforcement of the award was relegated to the courts." 
284 U. S., at 384-385 (footnote omitted). 
•See also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 
U. S. 59, 65 (1924) ("No contract of the carrier could reduce the amount 
legally payable; or release from liability a shipper who had assumed an ob-
ligation to pay the charges. Nor could any act or omission of the carrier 
(except the running of the statute of limitations) estop or preclude it from 
enforcing payment of the full amount by a person liable therefor"); Kansas 
City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 221 U. S. 639, 653 (1913) ("Neither the in-
tentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable published rate will 
bind the carrier or shipper. The lawful rate is that which the carrier must 
exact and that which the shipper must pay. The shipper's knowledge of 
the lawful rate is conclusively presumed"). 
In the instant case, the Commission did not find that the 
rates were unreasonable10 but rather concluded that the car-
rier had engaged in an unreasonable practice in violation of 
§ 10701 that should preclude it from collecting the filed rates. 
The Commission argues that under the filed rate doctrine, a 
finding that the carrier engaged in an unreasonable practice 
should, like a finding that the filed rate is unreasonable, 
disentitle the carrier to collection of the filed rate. We have 
never held that a carrier's unreasonable practice justifies de-
parture from the filed tariff schedule." But we need not 
resolve this issue today because we conclude that the justifi-
cation for departure from the filed tariff schedule that the 
ICC set forth in its Negotiated Rates policy rests on an inter-
pretation of the Act that is contrary to the language and 
structure of the statute as a whole and the requirements that 
make up the filed rate doctrine in particular. 
Under the Negotiated Rates policy, the ICC has deter-
mined that a carrier engages in an unreasonable practice 
when it attempts to collect the filed rate after the parties 
have negotiated a lower rate. The ICC argues that its con-
clusion is entitled to deference because § 10701 does not spe-
cifically address the types of practices that are to be consid-
ered unreasonable and because its construction is rational 
and consistent with the statute. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 
843 (1984). 
We disagree. For a century, this Court has held that the 
Act, as it incorporates the filed rate doctrine, forbids as 
discriminatory the secret negotiation and collection of rates 
lower than the filed rate. See supra, at . By refusing 
to order collection of the filed rate solely because the parties 
had agreed to a lower rate, the ICC has permitted the very 
price discrimination the Act by its terms seeks to prevent. 
See 49 U. S. C. § 10741. As we stated in Armour Packing 
Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 81 (1908): 
"If the rates are subject to secret alteration by special 
agreement then the statute will fail of its purpose to es-
tablish a rate duly published, known to all, and from 
which neither shipper nor carrier may depart. . . . [The 
Act] has provided for the establishing of one rate, to be 
filed as provided, subject to change as provided, and that 
rate to be while in force the only legal rate. Any other 
construction of the statute opens the door to the possibil-
ity of the very abuses of unequal rates which it was the 
design of the statute to prohibit and punish." 
Congress has not diverged from this interpretation and we 
10
 The ICC did not determine whether the tariff rates were unreasonable 
even though respondent requested such a determination. We therefore 
must assume, for purposes of our decision today, tha: the rates were rea-
sonable. The issue of the reasonableness of the tariff rates is open for 
exploration on remand. 
" None of our cases involving a determination by the ICC that the car-
rier engaged in an unreasonable practices has required departure from the 
filed tariff schedule altogether, instead, they have required merelv ihe 
application of a different filed tariff. For example, in Hewitt-Robins Inc. 
v. Eastern Freight-ways, Inc., 371 U. S. 84, 86 (1962;, the Commission's 
finding that a carrier had engaged in an unreasonable practice by routing 
intrastate shipments over interstate routes required orJy the application of 
a different filed rate, i. e., the intrastate rates, rather than departure from 
the tariff schedule entirely. See also Adams v. MilU, 286 U. S. 397, 412 
(1932) (reparations ordered constituted difference between one filed rate 
and another). Likewise, the cases in which the ICC has determined that a 
carrier engaged in an unreasonable practice by requiring a certain notation 
attached to the bill of lading to qualify the shipper for a reduced tariff also 
did not require deviation from the filed tariff. See Standard Brands, Inc. 
v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 350 I. C. C. 555 (1974); Carriers Traffic 
Service, Inc. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 881 F. 26 475, 481-4S2 (CA7 
1989) (collecting cases). 
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dechne to revisit it ourselves. See California v. FERC, 495 
U. S. , (1990), slip op. at 6 (recognizing the respect 
"this Court must accord to long-standing and well-entrenched 
decisions, especially those interpreting stautes that underlie 
complex regulatory regimes"). Once we have determined a 
statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination 
under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's 
later interpretation of the statute against our prior deter-
mination of the statute's meaning. Labelling the carrier's 
conduct an "unreasonable practice" cannot disguise the fact 
that the ICC is justifying deviation from the filed rate purely 
on the ground that the carrier and shipper have privately ne-
gotiated a lower rate. Stripped of its semantic cover, the 
Negotiated Rates policy and, more specifically, the Commis-
sion's interpretation of "unreasonable practices" thus stand 
revealed as flatly inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a 
whole, cf. Fort Stewart Softools v. FLRA, 495 U. S. , 
(1990) slip op., at 3; Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 
U. S. , (1990) [slip op., at 8], and §§ 10761 and 10762 
in particular. 
Nor can the Negotiated Rates policy be justified as a rem-
edy for the carrier's failure to comply with § 10762's directive 
to file the negotiated rate with the ICC. See Negotiated 
Rates I, 3 I. C. C. 2d, at 103. The Commission argues that 
the carrier should not receive a windfall, i. e., the higher filed 
rate, from its failure to comply with the statute. See Brief 
for United States 25-27. But § 10761 requires the carrier to 
collect the filed rate, and we have never accepted the argu-
ment that such "equities" are relevant to the application of 
§10761." See, e. g.9 Maxwell, 237 U. S., at 97. Indeed, 
strict adherence to the filed rate has never been justified on 
the ground that the carrier is equitably entitled to that rate, 
but rather that such adherence, despite its harsh conse-
quences in some cases, is necessary to enforcement of the 
Act. See supra, at . 
Compliance with §§ 10761 and 10762 is "utterly central" to 
the administration of the Act. Regular Common Carrier 
Conference v. United States, 253 U. S. App. D. D. 305, 308, 
793 F. 2d 376, 379 (1986). "Without [these provisions] . . . 
it would be monumentally difficult to enforce the requirement 
that rates be reasonable and nondiscriminatory, . . . and vir-
tually impossible for the public to assert its right to challenge 
the lawfulness of existing proposed rates." Ibid, (citations 
omitted). Although the ICC argues that the Negotiated 
Rates policy does not "abolis[h] the requirement in section 
10761 that carriers must continue to charge the tariff rate," 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a, the policy, by sanctioning adher-
ence to unfiled rates, undermines the basic structure of the 
Act. The ICC cannot review in advance the reasonableness 
u
 Even if the equities of the situation were relevant, it is difficult to see 
how the equities favor the shipper. One would think that a shipper who 
has the market power to require a carrier to reduce his tariffs could also 
require proof from a carrier that th£ negotiated rates had been filed before 
tendering the shipment, especially since there are commercial services pro-
viding up-to-the-minute details of the carrier's rate schedule. But see 
Fort Howard Papa- Co. v. Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc., No. MC-C-
10983, slip op., at 5 (Aug. 4, 1987) (unreasonable practice found even when 
the shipper had a copy of the tariff). Nevertheless, the Commission 
argues that if § 10761 "prevailed over the requirement of reasonable prac-
tices, a carrier could intentionally engage in 'bait and switch' tactics by 
negotiating one rate, fraudulently representing that it was properly filed, 
and then insisting upon collection of a higher tariff rate." Brief for United 
States 30. We note first that the Commission determined that there was 
no intentional or fraudulent conduct in this case. Moreover, any carrier 
who engaged in such conduct could be punished under 49 U. S. C. 
§ 11903(b) (1982 ed.). Finally, this risk of intentional misconduct on the 
part of a carrier has always existed and has never been considered suffi-
cient to justify a less stringent interpretation of § 10761. 
of unfiled rates. Likewise, other shippers cannot know if 
they should challenge a carrier's rates as discriminatory 
when many of the carrier's rates are privately negotiated and 
never disclosed to the ICC. Thus, although we agree that 
the Commission may have discretion to craft appropriate 
remedies for violations of the statute, see ICC v. American 
Trucking Assns., Inc. 467 U. S. 354, 364-365 (1984), the 
"remedy" articulated in the Negotiated Rates policy effec-
tively renders nugatory the requirements of §§10761 and 
10762 and conflicts directly with the core purposes of the Act. 
The ICC maintains, however, that the passage of the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA), Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 
793, justifies its Negotiated Rates policy. The MCA sub-
stantially deregulated the motor carrier industry in many 
ways in an effort to "promote competitive and efficient trans-
portation services." Pub. L. 96-296, §4, formerly codified 
at 49 U. S : C. § 10101(a)(7) (1976 ed., Supp. V). In addition 
to loosening entry controls, see §5, codified at 49 U. S. C. 
§10922 (1982 ed.), the MCA also created a zone of reason-
ableness within which carriers can raise rates without inter-
ference from the ICC. See § 11, codified at 49 U. S. C. 
§10708 (1982 ed.). More importantly, the MCA also allows 
motor carriers to operate as both common carriers and con-
tract carriers. See Pub. L. 96-296, § 10(b)(1), amending 49 
U. S. C. § 10930(a) (1982 ed.). A contract carrier transports 
property under exclusive agreements with a shipper, see 49 
U. S. C. §10102(14) (1982 ed.), and the Commission has ex-
empted all motor contract carriers from the requirements of 
§§ 10761 and 10762. See Exemption of Motor Contract Car-
riers from Tariff Filing Requirements, 133 M. C. C. 150 
(1983), aff'd sub nom. Central & Southern Motor Freight 
Tariff Assn., Inc. v. United States, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 
226, 757 F. 2d 301, cert, denied, 474 U. S. 1019 (1985).13 The 
Commission has also relaxed the regulations relating to 
motor common carriers, most significantly, by allowing de-
creased rates to go into effect one day after the filing of a 
tariff. See Slwrt Notice Effectiveness for Independently 
Filed Rates, 11. C. C. 2d 146 (1984), aff'd sub nom. Southern 
Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F. 2d 
1561 (CAll 1985).M In Negotiated Rates I and / / , the 
Commission concluded that in light of the more competitive 
environment, strict adherence to the filed rate doctrine "is in-
appropriate and unnecessary to deter discrimination today." 
Negotiated Rates I, 3 I. C. C , at 106. According to the 
Commission, " t h e inability of a shipper to rely on a carrier's 
"The Act specifically provides that the Commission may "grant re-
lief*' from the filing requirements to motor contract carriers "when relief 
is consistent with the public interest and the transportation policy." 
§§ 10761(b), 10762(f); see also § 10702(b). The Commission concluded that 
granting a class-wide exemption rather than individual exemptions was 
both in the public interest and consistent with the purpose behind the Act: 
See Exemption of Motor Contmct Carriers fivm Tariff Filing Require-
ments 133 M. C. C , 150, 156-158 (1983). The Commission has also 
allowed contract carriers to obtain permits to serve entire classes of 
unnamed shippers. See Issuance of Permits Authorizing Industrywide 
Service, 133 M. C. C. 298 (1983). 
" The Act provides that rates will not go into effect until 30 days after 
the filing of a tariff, see § 10762(c)(3), but specifically allows the Commis-
sion to reduce the period if "cause exists." § 10762(d). The Commission 
determined that cause existed to reduce the waiting period to one day after 
the filing of a tariff reducing rates and seven days after the filing of a tariff 
increasing rates. See Short Notice Effectiveness for Independently Filed 
Rates, 1T C. C. 2d, 146, 150-160 (1982). In addition, the Commission has 
determined that neither tariffs applicable to a single shipper nor rates pro-
viding volume discounts are per se discriminator}'- See Rates for a 
Named Shipper or Receiver, 367 I. C. C. 2d 959 (19S4); Petition for De-
claratory Order—Lawfulness of Volume Discount Rates by Motor Com-
mon Carriers of Propeity, 365 I. C. C. 711 (1982). We express no view 
today on the validity of such policies. 
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interpretation of a tariff is a greater evil than the remote pos-
sibility that a carrier might intentionally misquote an appli-
cable tariff rate to discriminate illegally between shippers.'" 
Ibid., quoting Seaboard System R. Co. v. United States, 794 
F. 2d 635, 638 (CAll 1986). 
We reject this argument. Although the Commission has 
both the authority and expertise generally to adopt new poli-
cies when faced with new developments in the industry, see 
American Trucking Assns, Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 
Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967), it does not have the power 
to adopt a policy that directly conflicts with its governing 
statute. Nothing in the MCA repeals §§ 10761 and 10762 or 
casts doubt on our prior interpretation of those sections. 
Generalized congressional exhortations to "increase compe-
tition" cannot provide the ICC authority to alter the well-
established statutory filed rate requirements. As we said in 
Square D Co. v. Niagara^rontier Traffic Bureau, Inc., with 
respect to a similarly longstanding judicial interpretation of 
the Act: 
"Congress must be presumed to have been fully cogni-
zant of this interpretation of the statutory scheme, which 
had been a significant part of our settled law for over half 
a century, and . . . Congress did not see fit to change it 
when Congress carefully reexamined this area of the law 
in 1980. [Respondent has] pointed to no specific statu-
tory provision or legislative history indicating a specific 
congressional intention to overturn the longstanding . . . 
construction; harmony with the general legislative pur-
pose is inadequate for that formidable task." 476 U. S., 
at 420 (footnotes omitted). 
See also California v. FERC, 495 U. S., at , slip op., at 
6-7. Even before the passage of the MCA, Congress had 
allowed the Commission to exempt motor contract carriers 
from the requirement that they adhere to the published tar-
iff, see 49 U. S. C. § 10761(b) (1982 ed.), demonstrating that 
Congress is aware of the requirement and has deliberately 
chosen not to disturb it with respect to motor common carri-
ers.15 If strict adherence to §§ 10761 and 10762 as embodied 
in the filed rate doctrine has become an anachronism in the 
wake of the MCA, it is the responsibility of Congress to mod-
ify or eliminate these sections. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-
versed and the cause remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion but add a few words in response 
to JUSTICE STEVENS' assertion that the Court has "fail[ed] to 
adhere today to the teaching of Chevron [U.S.A. Inc. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 
(1984)]." Post, at 14.' 
In my view, the Court correctly relies upon our -p:-r>r 
"filed-rate" decisions, which were based not on the "regula-
tory scheme as a whole," post, at 6—by which JUSTICE STE-
VENS appears to mean the regulatory climate within which 
" Moreover, in the Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. 96-454, 94 Stat. 2011, Congress provided that "motor common carrier[s] 
providing transportation of household goods . . . may, subject to the provi-
sions of this chapter (including the general tariff requirements of section 
10762 of this title), establish a rate for the transportation of household 
goods which is based on the carrier's written, binding estimate of charges 
for providing such transportation." 49 U. S. C § 10735(a)(1) ((1982 ed., 
Supp. V) (emphasis added). This exception for household goods carriers 
also demonstrates that Congress is aware of, but has elected not to elimi-
nate as applied to other motor common carriers, the general requirements 
of §§ 10761 and 10762. 
the statute then operated, post, at 7-9—but rather on the 
text of the statute. JUSTICE STEVENS argues that there is 
no textual limitation on the scope of the term "reasonable," as 
that term is used in 49 U. S. C. § 10701(a) (1982 ed.) ("A . . . 
practice related to transportation or service by a carrier . . . 
must be reasonable"), and that we must therefore accord def-
erence to the Commission's interpretation of that term. 
Post, at 4, 13-14. I do not agree. Whatever else may'qual-
ify as an unreasonable practice, under no sensible construc-
tion of that term could it consist of failing to do what the stat-
ute explicitly prohibits doing—viz., charging or receiving a 
rate different from the rate specified in a tariff. 49 U. S. C. 
§ 10761(a) (1982 ed.). 
Nor can the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this subtitle," 
§ 10761(a) carry the enormous weight that JUSTICE STEVENS 
places upon it. Post, at 5, and n. 6. That clause is affixed 
to only* the first sentence of § 10761(a), which states that be-
fore providing transportation and senices, certain carriers 
must place their rates on file. (What is referred to by the 
exception is obvious—such provisions as 49 U. S. C. § 10762 
(a)(1) (1982 ed.), which states that certain motor contract car-
riers that serve only one shipper need file only minimum 
rates.) But it is the second sentence of § 10761(a) that con-
tains the requirement that only filed rates can be charged. 
Of course the subject of the second sentence, "ftjhat earner" 
(emphasis added), must reasonably be deemed to refer to a 
carrier covered by the first sentence—so that the obligation 
to charge the filed rate applies only to those carriers required 
to file "the rate for the transportation or service." (Thus, a 
motor contract carrier required to file only minimum rates 
under § 10762(a)(1) can charge rates higher than those mini-
mums.) But there is no way in which the "[e]xcept as pro-
vided" clause can be imported directly into the second sen-
tence, causing it to recite an exception to the obligation to 
charge the required-to-be-filed rate, which JUSTICE STE-
VENS asserts can refer to the "reasonable practices" require-
ment of § 10701(a) as readily as it can to the "reasonable rate" 
requirement. Post, at 4. The basis for the "unreasonable 
rate" exception to the "filed rate" rule is not the "[ejxeept as 
provided" language at all; rather it is the need to reconcile 
two textual provisions that would otherwise be categorically 
inconsistent (do not charge unreasonable rates, but charge 
whatever rates you have filed). While an "unreasonable 
rate" unavoidably means a rate that is economically unrea-
sonable—so that where economic unreasonableness exists 
§§ 10701(a) and 10761(a) need to be reconciled by assuming an 
implicit but unexpressed exception to the filed-rate require-
ment—an "unreasonable practice" does not unavoidably 
mean charging the filed rate when a different rate has been 
promised, so with respect to that term normal construction 
of § 10701(a) (as in the previous paragraph) avoids any 
difficulty. 
Finally, JUSTICE STEVENS points to changes in the motor 
carrier industry occasioned in part by 1980 amendments to 
the statute, which amendments he says "represented a fun-
damental policy choice in favor of deregulation." Post, at 9. 
See also post, at 9-13. But the only amendments of any rele-
vance to the requirement of § 10761(a) that a carrier collect 
no rate other than the filed rate are those that remove certain 
pre-existing barriers to motor contract carriage, see gener-
ally Central & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Association, 
Inc. v. United States, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 226, 757 F. 2d 
301, 311-312 (1985) (per curiam)—which amendments have 
the practical effect of making more carriers eligible for the 
pre-existing exception to the filing requirement of § 10761(a), 
permitting the Commission to exempt them under certain cir-
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cumstances. 49 U. S. C. § 10761(b) (1982 ed.). While this 
plainly reflects an intent to deregulate, it reflects an intent to 
deregulate within the framework of the existing statutory 
scheme. Perhaps deregulation cannot efficiently be accom-
plished within that framework, but that is Congress' choice 
and not the Commission's or ours. It may well be, as JUS-
TICE STEVENS thinks, that after the 1980 amendments and 
the various administrative changes that the Commission has 
made by rule, "'[t]he skeleton of regulation remains; the flesh 
has been stripped away.'" Post, at 10, quoting Orscheln 
Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d 
642, 644-645 (CA7 1990). But it is the skeleton we are con-
struing, and we must read it for what it says. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with^hom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, 
dissenting. ? 
The "filed rate doctrine" was developed in the 19th century 
as part of a program to regulate the ruthless exercise of mo-
nopoly power by the nation's railroads. Today the Court 
places an interpretation on that doctrine even more strict 
than the original version. In doing so, the Court misreads 
the text of the Interstate Commerce Act (Act), 49 U. S. C. 
§ 10101 et seq. (1982 ed.), ignores the history of motor carrier 
regulation in this country, and gives no deference to the sen-
sible construction of the Act by six Courts of Appeals l and 
the administrative agency responsible for its enforcement. 
Most significantly, the majority fails to appreciate the signifi-
cance of the "sea change" in the statutory scheme that has 
converted a regime of regulated monopoly pricing into a 
highly competitive market. Even wearing his famous blind-
ers, old Dobbin would see through the tired arguments the 
Court accepts today. 
I 
As originally enacted in 1887, the Act provided, in part: 
"And when any such common carrier shall have estab-
lished and published its rates, fares, and charges in 
compliance with the provisions of this section, it shall be 
unlawful for such common carrier to charge, demand, 
collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater 
or less compensation for the transportation of passen-
gers or property, or for any services in connection there-
with, than is specified in such published schedule of 
rates, fares, and charges as may at the time be in force." 
24 Stat. 381. 
Read literally, this text commanded strict adherence to the 
tariffs filed by a carrier. From the beginning, however, the 
Court construed that command as subject to the unstated ex-
ception that a filed rate would not be enforced if the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (Commission) determined that 
the rates were "unreasonable."2 Amendments to the Act 
incorporated language that expressly allows exceptions in 
1
 See Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v. Transtop* Inc., F. 2d (CA1 
1990); Orpcheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d 
642 (CA7 1990); Maislin v. Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F. 2d 400 (CA8 1989) 
(case below); West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F. 2d 
1016 (CA9 1990); Seaboard System R. Co. v. United States, 794 F. 2d 635 
(CA11 1986). The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Seaboard System involved railroad regulation rather than motor 
carrier regulation, but presented very similar issues. 
The sole exception to this consensus is hi re Caravan Refrigerated 
Cargo, Inc., 864 F. 2d 388 (CA5 1989). 
'Thus, in the most frequently quoted statement of the filed rate doc-
trine, we wrote: 
"Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly filed is 
the only lawful charge. Deviation from it is not permitted upon any pre-
text. Shippers and travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as 
cases in which the Commission determines that strict en-
forcement would be unreasonable.* 
Thus, 49 U. S. C. § 10761(a) (1982 ed.) now provides: 
"Except as provided in this subtitle, a carrier providing 
transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission under chapter 105 
of this title shall provide that transportation or service 
only if the rate for the transportation or service is con-
tained in a tariff that is in effect under this subchapter. 
That carrier may not charge or receive a different com-
pensation for that transportation or service than the rate 
specified in the tariff whether by returning a part of that 
rate to a person, giving a person a privilege, allowing the 
use of a facility that affects the value of that transporta-
tion or service, or another device." (Emphasis added). 
The emphasized language in the foregoing provision obvi-
ously refers, inter alia, to 49 U. S. C. § 10701(a) which 
states, in part: 
"A rate (other than a rail rate), classification, rule, or 
practice related to transportation or service provided by 
a carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission under chapter 105 of this title 
must be reasonable." (Emphasis added). 
Furthermore, 49 U. S. C. § 10704(b) (1982 ed.) expressly au-
thorizes the Commission, after finding that a rate or practice 
of a carrier is unreasonable, to prescribe the rate or practice 
that the carrier must follow.4 
The action of the Commission in this case faithfully tracks 
its statutory grant of authority. After considering all of the 
relevant evidence, the Commission determined "that it would 
be an unreasonable practice now to require Primary to pay 
undercharges for the difference between the negotiated rates 
and the tariff rates." App. to Pet for Cert. 44a. That 
determination was unquestionably consistent with the plain 
language of the statute governing the Commission's author-
ity. A carrier's failure to file negotiated rates obviously 
does not make it reasonable for the carrier to quote low rates 
and collect higher ones; the Commission is free to find, as it 
has done, that a practice of misquotation, failure to file, and 
subsequent collection is unreasonable under § 10701(a). 
The Court offers no reason whatsoever to doubt this con-
clusion. Indeed, the Court's discussion of the statutory text 
consists almost entirely of vague references to some unarticu-
lated interplay between §§ 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1),6 see 
well as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission 
to be unreasonable." (Emphasis added). Louisville & Nashville R. Co. 
v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915). 
Similarly, in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163 
(1922), we wrote: 
"The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a raie are meas-
ured by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this 
rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and ship-
per." (Emphasis added). 
• See, e. g., 34 Stat. 587. 
4
 49 U. S. C. § lO704(bXD (1982 ed. and Supp. V) provides in part: 
"When the Commission decides that a rate charged or collected by— 
"(A) a motor common carrier for providing transportation subject to its 
jurisdiction under subchapter II of chapter 105 of this title by itself, with 
another motor common carrier, with a rail, express, or water common car-
rier, or any of them; 
"or that a classification, rule, or practice of that carrier, does or will violate 
this chapter, the Commission shall prescribe the rate (including a maxi-
mum or minimum rate, or both), classification, rule, or practice to be 
followed." 
•49 U. S. C. § 10762(a)(1) (1982 ed.) provides: 
"A motor common carrier shall publish and file with the Commission tariffs 
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ante, at 9, an interplay which the Court contends would be 
"renderfed] nugatory" if carriers are not permitted to obtain 
payment of the filed rate when they have led shippers to rely 
upon a lower negotiated rate. Ante, at 15. For the reasons 
I have already stated, the text of those provisions does not 
generate any "interplay" capable of sustaining so rigid an in-
ference. The Court virtually concedes as much, for it recog-
nizes that the unreasonableness of a rate is a longstanding 
ground for denying collection of the filed rate, ante, at 11, 
and n. 10, and refuses to hold that the unreasonableness of a 
practice can never bar collection of a filed rate, ante, at 12. 
Having admitted that the doctrine synthesized from the 
"interplay" between §§ 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1) is susceptible 
of exceptions based upon the nature of a carrier's rates and 
practices, the Court can argue only that this particular ex-
ception is impermissible.* The source of the exceptions is, 
however, not the "interjSay" that dominates the majority's 
reasoning, but the combined effect of the "Except as other-
wise provided" language of § 10761(a) and the express author-
ity to determine reasonableness granted to the Commission 
by § 10701(a). This second "interplay" gets little attention 
from the majority, and it is difficult to see how the text of 
either component might yield the distinction which the ma-
jority insists upon drawing. Nor can the Court mean that 
the exception literally voids the obligations imposed by 
§§ 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1) because the Commission main-
tains, and the Court does not deny, that the filed rate doc-
trine would still provide an effective right to recover for un-
dercharges in some cases. See, e. g., NITL-Petition to 
Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier 
Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623, 629, and n. 13 (1989). Moreover, 
even if the "filed rate doctrine" were discarded entirely, a 
containing the rates for transportation it may provide under this subtitle. 
The Commission may prescribe other information that motor common car-
riers shall include in their tariffs." 
* The Court attempts to make hay of the fact that under § 10761(a) carri-
ers "may not charge or receive a different compensation for that transpor-
tation or service than the rate specified in the tariff." According to the 
Court, this provision "requires the carrier to collect the filed rate." Ante, 
at 14. That is true if the Court means that the carrier is obligated to seek 
payment of the filed rate, but not if the Court means that the carrier is 
entitled to receive payment of the filed rate. The longstanding reason-
ableness exception to the filed rate doctrine—an exception no: contested 
by the Court—makes this much clear. Moreover, as has already been 
noted, the clause that prefaces § 10761(a) allows for the existence of excep-
tions to the collection requirement. The Court's argument simply begs 
the question before us, which is under what conditions a valid defense to a 
carrier's suit may exist. 
Even less persuasive than the Court's argument from the collection re-
quirement is a related claim made by petitioners. They contend that be-
cause carriers are legally obligated to collect the filed rate, the practice of 
filing suit to collect that rate cannot be unreasonable. See, e. g., Reply 
Brief for Petitioners 7-8. This argument, too, ignores the exceptions 
clause at the beginning of § 10761(a). Moreover, the argument 
mischaracterizes the practice deemM unreasonable by the Commission: a 
collection suit is one component of that practice, even though the suit con-
sidered in isolation from the broader course of conduct is not itself unrea-
sonable. See NITL-Petition to Institute > Rulemaking on Negotiated 
Motor Common Carrier Rates, 51. C. C. 2d 623, 628, n. 11 (1989); see also 
ante, at 4-5. 
JUSTICE SCALIA trots out the same argument again, this time harnessed 
to an assertion that the exceptions clause applies only to the first sentence 
of § 10761(a). Ante, at 2 (concurring opinion). Although that is perhaps a 
possible reading of § 10761(a), it is obviously not the only one. There is no 
reason to believe that it is an interpretation of the section that the Commis-
sion must accept. In any event, JUSTICE SCALIA admits that § 10701(a)— 
which imposes a reasonableness condition upon practices and rates alike— 
modifies the requirements of § 10761(a), and this admission renders moot 
his discussion of the exceptions clause. Ante, at 2-3 (concurring opinion). 
In light of that admission, JUSTICE SCALIA'S argument fails for exactly the 
reasons set out above. 
knowing or willful failure to comply with §§ 10761(a) and 
10762(a)(1) may subject a carrier to prosecution.7 
The Court's assertion that the agency policy now before us 
'Venders nugatory" the "interplay" between §§ 10761(a) and 
10762(a)(1) therefore amounts to no more than an observation 
that the policy substantially diminishes the importance of the 
'Tiled rate doctrine" as a means for enforcing those sections. 
Consideration of the statute's structure makes all the more 
clear what should already be evident from the statutory text: 
the Court's observation is true but utterly irrelevant. 
II 
Because no particular provision of the statute supports the 
Court's position, its principal argument must be that the 
agency's construction of the Act is inconsistent with the regu-
latory scheme as a whole. See ante, at 13. There are, of 
course,' important differences between markets in which, 
prices are regulated, either by private cartels or by public au-
thority, and those in which prices are the product of inde-
pendent decisions by competitors. Rules requiring adher-
ence to predetermined prices are characteristic of regulated 
markets, but are incompatible with independent pricing in a 
competitive market.8 The "filed rate doctrine" has played 
an important role, not just in the segments of the transporta-
tion industry regulated by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, but in other regulated markets as well.6 It re-
quires the courts to respect the public agency's control over 
market prices and industry practices; moreover, it signifi-
cantly reduces the temptation of regulated parties to deviate 
from the market-wide rules formulated by the agency. 
The filed rate doctrine has been a part of our law during 
the century of regulation of the railroad industry by the Com-
mission. In 1935, when Congress decided to impose eco-
nomic regulation on the motor carrier industry, partly if not 
primarily in order to protect the railroads from too much 
competition,10 the filed rate doctrine was applied to their 
7See, e. p., 49 U. S. C. §§ 11903 and 11904 (1982 ed.). 
•See, e. g., Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 
582-583 (1936) (regulation by private agreement in violation of the Sher-
man Act); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 99 (1980) (state regulation of wine prices); United Gas 
Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 338 (1D56) (fed-
eral regulation of natural gas prices). 
'See, e. g., Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public 
Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 251-252 (1951) (federal regulation of prices for 
electrical power); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U. S. 571, 
577-578 (1981) (federal regulation of prices for natural gas); H. J. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. , , n. 1 (19S9) (state 
regulation of rates for telephone service). 
10
 "Though identical statutory standards govern both motor carrier and 
rail consolidations, their legislative backgrounds differ. The demand for 
motor carrier regulation came, not from shippers, as in railroads, but from 
the roads themselves, who urged that virtually unregulated motor carrier 
competition threatened railroad financial stability. This view wTas also 
supported by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Co-
ordinator of Transportation who, in his 1934 and 1935 reports, recom-
mended legislation regulating interstate motor carriers. In addition, dur-
ing hearings on proposed legislation, many truck operators, previously 
opposed to Federal regulation, favored such control because they feared 
the effects of unrestrained competition on the motor carrier industry itself. 
The result was legislation, enacted in 1935, which from the first placed con-
siderable restraint on motor carrier competition. 
"Entry was controlled by certificates of convenience and necessity; those 
already in the field were given a preferred position by the grandfather 
clauses, assuring not only the right to continue in operation, but also to ex-
pand within the areas or between the points which they already served. 
Moreover, the Commission was empowered to establish niinimum as wTell 
as maximum rates. And this minimum rate power was soon utilized by 
the Commission both to protect the railroads from motor carrier compe-
tition as well as to safeguard the motor carrier industry from 'destructive' 
competition within its own ranks. Indeed, from the inception of motor 
carrier regulation to the present day, the power to fix minimum rates has 
been more significant than the authority to fix maximum charges." Re-
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rates just as it had previously applied to the railroads. It 
had the same regulatory purpose.11 In its applications dur-
ing the period of regulatory control over motor carrier rate-
making, the doctrine was for the most part applied to rein-
force the policies and the decisions of the regulatory agency.12 
After years of debate over whether it was sound policy to 
substitute regulation for competition in the motor carrier in-
dustry, Congress decided to eliminate the regulatory barri-
ers to free entry and individual ratemaking. The 1980 
amendments to the Act represented a fundamental policy 
choice in favor of deregulation." Overnight the application 
of the filed rate doctrine in that market became an anachro-
nism. As Judge Posner has explained: 
"Many years later came deregulation, which has 
changed the trucking industry beyond recognition. As 
a result of amendments made to the Motor Carrier Act in 
port of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust 
Laws 265 (1956). 
u
 T o understand the purpose of the filed-rate doctrine and hence the 
Commission's recent efforts to relax it, on which see National Industrial 
Transportation League—Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated 
Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99 (19S6); Buckeye Cellulose 
Corp. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R.,1I. C. C. 2d 767 (1985), affirmed as 
Seaboard System R. R. v. United States, supra; Petition to Institute 
Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 
623 (1989), one must understand the history of federal regulation of com-
mon carriers. Railroads have heavy fixed costs, and in their heyday faced 
Utile effective competition from other modes of transportation. Naturally 
they tended to load the fixed costs onto those shippers who had poor com-
petitive alternatives and to charge low prices to those shippers who had 
good alternatives by reason of (for example) being big enough to induce 
two or more railroads to serve their plants. This created a disparity in 
transportation costs painful to shippers who paid high railroad rates and 
were competing with shippers who paid low rates, and it also undermined 
the railroads' efforts to cartelize railroad transportation. The confluence 
of interests between railroads and weak shippers resulted in a regulatory 
scheme in which railroads were forbidden both to price off tariff and to 
refuse service to any shipper at the tariffed rate. Western Transportation 
Co. v. Wilson & Co., supra, 682 F. 2d at 1230-31. The scheme would 
have been undermined if carriers had been permitted to negotiate secret 
discounts with favored shippers. Regular Common Carrier Conference v. 
United States, 793 F. 2d 376, 379 (D. C. Cir. 1986). To deter this was the 
office of the filed-rate doctrine. It authorized carriers to recover the dis-
counts regardless, which meant that the shipper could not count on being 
able to keep any discount that the railroad might dangle before it. Motor 
carriers do not have heavy fixed costs, but they do no* like competition any 
more than railroads do, so when in 1935 they were brought under federal 
regulation (in major part to protect the railroads from their competition) 
they were placed under the filed-rate doctrine too." Orscheln Bros. Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d 642, 643-644 (CA7 1990). 
u
 As the Court's opinion makes clear, there was no tension between judi-
cial interpretation and agency policy in the cases that developed the filed 
rate doctrine. See ante, at 10, citing Poor v. Chicago, B. <£ Q. R. Co., 12 
I. C. C. 418, 421-422 (1907). On the contrary, a recurring theme in those 
cases is that the Commission, rather than the courts, should have primary 
responsibility for administration of the statute. The filed rate doctrine 
was regarded in significant part as a means for ensuring that this allocation 
of responsibility was respected. See, e. g., Texas <£ Pacific R. Co. v. Abi-
lene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 440-442 (1907); Arizona Grocery Co. v. 
Atchison, T., & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384-3S5 (1932); Baldwin v. 
Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 483-485 (1939). The most nota-
ble exception to this pattern is the 6-to-4 decision in T.I.M.E. Inc. v. 
United States, 359 U. S. 464 (1959), in which this Court prohibited district 
courts from staving collection proceedings pending agency review of the 
reasonableness of a filed rate. Although T.I.M.E. is strikingly similar to 
today's decision in a host of respects, the majority does not rely upon it. 
Its reluctance to place any substantial weight upon T.I.M.E. is easily un-
derstood, because that precedent was greatly limited by this Court's sub-
sequent decision in Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-ways, Inc., 371 
U. S. 84, 88-89 (1962), and what remained of it was soon thereafter unam-
biguously repudiated by Congress. See Act of Sept. 6, 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-170, §§6-7, 79 Stat. 651-652 (codified at 49 U. S. C. § 11705(b)(3) 
(1982 ed. and Supp. V), 49 U. S. C. § 11706(c)(2) (1952 ed.)). 
u
 Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793. 
1980 and their interpretation by the Commission, the 
present regime is essentially one of free competition. 
No longer does the ICC seek to nurture and protect car-
tel pricing and division of markets. A motor carrier 
that wants to lower its price can file a new tariff effective 
the following day. Short Notice Effectiveness for Inde-
pendently Filed Motor Carrier and Freight Forwarder 
Rates, 1 I. C. C. 2d 146 (1984), affirmed as Southern 
Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F. 
2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1985). No longer does the Commis-
sion seek to limit the number of motor carriers, which 
has more than doubled in less than a decade. Most im-
portant, a carrier and shipper who want to get out from 
under tariff regulation altogether have only to negotiate 
a contract of carriage, and then the lawful price is the 
price in the contract rather than in any filed tariff. 
There used to be all sorts of restrictions on contract car-
riage, which greatly limited it as an escape hatch from 
regulation. There are no longer. Wheaton Van Lines, 
Inc. v. ICC, 731 F. 2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1984). The skele-
ton of regulation remains; the flesh has been stripped 
away." Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith 
Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d 642, 644-645 (CA7 1990). 
The significance of these fundamental changes was also 
noted and explained by Judge Alarcon: 
"A variety of practices that previously would have been 
considered discriminatory are now allowed. For exam-
ple, the ICC has recently ruled that volume discount 
rates are not per se unlawfiil and may be justified by cost 
savings to the carrier. See Lawfulness of Volume Dis-
count Rates by Motor Common Carrier of Property, 365 
I. C. C. 711,715-16 (1982). Moreover, carriers may im-
pose geographic or product line restrictions that must be 
met to obtain rate reductions. See Rates for Named 
Shipper or Receiver, 367 I. C. C. 959, 962-965 (1984). 
"In addition to increased competitive pressures, statu-
tory changes, and a relaxed regulatory climate, the 
ICC's Negotiated Rates decisions are a practical re-
sponse to the information costs faced by shippers. The 
ease of filing tariffs and the sheer number filed no longer 
makes it appropriate to allocate the burden of discover-
ing a filed rate to the shipper in all cases. Reduced 
tariff rates may now be filed to become effective on one 
day's notice." West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Weyer-
haeuser Co., 893 F. 2d 1016, 1026 (CA9 1990). 
The Court catalogues these reforms, ante, at 15-16, but 
fails to analyze their implications for the "reasonableness" re-
quirement of § 10701(a) and, consequently, for the provisions 
of § 10761(a). What the Court now misses has been suc-
cinctly set forth by Judge Alarcon: 
"The ICC's determination that the collection of under-
charges constitutes an unreasonable practice if the ship-
per is unaware of the filed rate is also a reflection of 
changing legislative goals. Congress modified national 
transportation policy when it amended 49 U. S. C. 
§ 10101(a) in the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. Section 
10101(a)(2) now directs the Commission, in regulating 
transportation by motor carrier, to promote competitive 
and efficient transportation services in order to (A) meet 
the needs of shippers, receivers, passengers, and con-
sumers; [and] (B) allow a variety of quality and price op-
tions to meet changing market demands and the diverse 
requirements of the shipping and traveling public . . . ' 
49 U. S. C. § 10101(a)(1)(A), (B) (1982). In addition, 
§ 10101(a)(1)(D) directs the ICC to encourage the estab-
lishment of reasonable transportation rates without *un-
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fair or destructive competitive practices.' 49 U. S. C 
§ 10101(a)(1)(D) (1982). Congress intended these sec-
tions of the Motor Carrier Act t o emphasize the impor-
tance of competition and efficiency as the most desirable 
means for achieving transportation goals while, at the 
same time, providing the Commission with sufficient 
flexibility to promote the public interest.' H. R. Rep. 
No. 96-1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 
U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2283, 2294. 
"Section 10701(a) provides the ICC with the mecha-
nism to put into effect Congress* restated goals of na-
tional transportation policy. By declaring the adher-
ence to filed rates unreasonable under the circumstances 
presented in this case, the ICC has demonstrated its in-
tention to prevent carriers from engaging in unfair com-
petitive practices." 893 F. 2d, at 1026-1027. 
Despite the Court's pu l l ing suggestion that the filed rate 
doctrine is essential to the "core purposes of the Act," ante, 
at 15, the doctrine is instead, as the Court elsewhere seems 
to concede, "an anachronism in the wake of the [Motor Car-
rier Act of 1980]," ante, at 18. If plain text is a poor basis for 
the Court's holding, statutory purpose is altogether worse. 
As Judge Posner has explained: 
"Counsel for the carrier in this case—which is to say 
for the carrier's trustee in bankruptcy—conceded at ar-
gument that the motor carrier industry is today highly 
competitive. But if so, the filed-rate doctrine has lost 
its raison d'etre. The classic explanations for the doc-
trine are from a different world. 'If a mistake in naming 
a rate between two given points is to. be accepted as re-
quiring the application of that rate by the carrier, the 
great principle of equality in rates, to secure which was 
the very purpose and object of the enactment of these 
several statutes, might as well be abandoned.' Poor v. 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., supra, 12 I. C. C. 
at 421. 'Stability and equality of rates are more impor-
tant to commercial interests than reduced rates.' Id., at 
422. 'Occasional hardships may result from any inelas-
tic rule of general application. The principle, however, 
is vital in our commercial life that there shall be one fixed 
and absolutely rigid rate governing the transportation at 
a given time of any given commodity between two give 
points.' Id., at 423. 
"Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. Firms in a 
competitive market cannot discriminate against weak 
shippers, for even the weak shipper has, by definition of 
competition, alternative sources of supply to which to 
turn if one of his suppliers tries to make a monopoly 
profit off him. 'In the more competitive, more flexible 
pricing atmosphere created by [deregulation], there is 
little likelihood of carriers using a rate misquotation as a 
means to discriminate in favor of particular shippers.' 
Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor 
Common Carrier Rates, supra, 5 I. C. C. 2d at 625. 
And since it is no longer the policy of Congress or the 
>ICC to foster monopoly pricing in the motor carrier in-
dustry, no public object is served by forcing carriers to 
adhere to published price schedules regardless of circum-
stances. All this the Commission found and persua-
sively articulated in National Industrial Transportation 
League, supra, 3 I. C. C. 2d at 104-08." Orscheln, 899 
F. 2d, at 644-645. 
Judge Posner's conclusion that strict mechanical adherence 
to the filed rate doctrine produces absurd results and serves 
no social purpose, id., at 645, is one that I share. It is like-
wise shared by the agency charged with administration of the 
Act. 
I l l 
A few years ago, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. S37 (1984), we reit-
erated the importance of giving appropriate deference to an 
agency's reasonable interpretation of its governing statute. 
Indeed, long before our decision in Chevron, we recognized 
that even when faced with a 'long history of the Commis-
sion's construction and application of the Act contrary to its 
present position," American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. T. & 
S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 415 (1967), we must defer to the 
Commission's interpretation of a statute which it is responsi-
ble for administering: 
"we agree that the Commission, faced with new develop-
ments or in light of reconsideration of the relevant facts 
and its mandate, may alter its past interpretation and 
overturn past administrative rulings and practice 
In fact, although we make no judgment as to the policy 
aspects of the Commisssion's action, this kind of flexibil-
ity and adaptibility to changing needs and patterns of 
transportation is an essential part of the office of a regu-
latory agency." Id., at 416. 
Four Courts of Appeals have expressly invoked Chevron in 
the course of upholding the agency action challenged in this 
case," but this Court does not deem Chevron—or any other 
case involving deference to agency action—worthy of ex-
tended discussion. The Court dismisses Chevron by means 
of a conclusory assertion that the agency's interpretation is 
inconsistent with "the statutory scheme as a whole." Ante, 
at 12-13. Insofar as the Court offers any justification for 
that result, it does so by relying on cases in which this 
Court's action was entirely consistent with the agency's in-
terpretation of the Act.1S The fact that the Court has strictly 
enforced the filed rate doctrine in the many cases in which it 
served the agency's regulatory purposes provides no justifi-
cation for enforcing the doctrine in a competitive market in 
which it frustrates the agency's attempt to carry out the 
plainly expressed intent of Congress. 
The Court's failure to adhere today to the teaching of Chev-
ron is compounded by its misplaced reliance on Square D Co. 
v. Niagra Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409 (1986). 
See ante, at 17. In Square D, we adhered to a longstanding 
settled construction of § 4 of the Clayton Act that had not 
been affected by any subsequent statutory amendment. No 
question of agreeing or disagreeing with agency action, or 
with an agency's interpretation of a congressional policy 
choice, was presented. That case is therefore totally inappli-
cable to the question presented here. Even less persuasive 
authority for the Court's position is Calif on-.ia v. FERC, 495 
U. S. (1990), see ante, at 13, 17, a case in which we up-
held an agency interpretation that conformed to longstanding 
precedent. 
IV 
Finally, I must express my emphatic agreement with the 
Commission's conclusion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, that an 
unreasonable practice would result if the carrier in this case 
were rewarded for violating its duty to file a new rate 
promptly. There is no evidence of discrimination in this 
record; nor is there any reason to believe that any shipper or 
any competing motor carrier was harmed by the negotiated 
rate or by the failure to file it. The only consequence of to-
u
 Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v. Transtop, Inc., F. 2d , 
(CA1 1990); Orscheln Bivs. Truck Lines, Inc. v. ZenilA Electric Corp., 899 
F. 2d 642, 646 (CAT 1990); Maislin v. Primary Steel. Inc., 879 F. 2d 400, 
406 (CA8 19S9) (case below); West Coast Truck Lines. Inc. v. Weyerhauser 
Co., 893 F . 2d 1016, 1023, 1025-1026 (CA9 1990). 
u
 See, n. 12, supra. 
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day's misguided decision is to produce a bonanza for the 
bankruptcy bar. "Now that off-tariff pricing is harmless to 
the (de)regulatory scheme, the only purpose served by mak-
ing the statutory' obligation to price in conformity with pub-
lished tariffs draconian is to provide windfalls for unsecured 
creditors in bankruptcy." Orsckeln, 899 F. 2d, at 646. 
As Justice Black said more than 30 years ago in similar cir-
cumstances, "I am unable to understand why the Court 
strains so hard to reach so bad a result." T.LM.E. Inc. v. 
United States, 359 U. S. 464, 481 (1959) (dissenting opinion). 
The Court's analysis is plausible only if read as a historical 
excursus about a statute that no longer exists. Nothing 
more than blind adherence to language in cases that have 
nothing to do with the present situation supports today's 
result. 
I respectfully dissent. 
T H O M A S M. A U C H I N C L O S S JJ?., Washington, D.C. ( B R I A N L. 
T R O I A N O . REA, CROSS & A U C H I N C L O S S , and DAVID G. 
S P E R R Y , on the briefs) for petitioners; T H O M A S W. M E R R I L L , 
Deputy Solicitor General ( K E N N E T H W. S T A R R , Sol. Gen., MI-
C H A E L R. DREEBEN, Asst. to the Sol. Gen., R O B E R T S. BURK, 
ICC Gen. Counsel, ELLEN D. H A N S O N , ICC Assoc. Gen. Counsel, 
and CECELIA E. H I G G I N S , ICC attys., on the briefs) for 
respondent 
Nos. 8S-1S72 AND 88-2074 
CYNTHIA RUTAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
88-1872 v. 
REPUBLICAN PARTY,OF ILLINOIS ET AL. 
MARK FRECH, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
88-2074 v. 
CYNTHIA RUTAN ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Syllabus 
No. 88-1S72. Argued January 16, 1990-Decided June 21. 1990* 
The Illinois Governor issued an executive order instituting a hiring freeze, 
whereby state officials are prohibited from hiring any employee, filling 
any vacancy, creating any new position, or taking any similar action 
without the Governor's "express permission." Petitioners and cross-
respondents —an applicant for employment, employees who had been de-
nied promotions or transfers, and former employees who had not been 
recalled after layoffs —brought suit in the District Court, alleging that, 
by means of the freeze, the Governor was operating a political patronage 
system; that they had suffered discrimination in state employment be-
cause they had not been Republican Party supporters; and that th.s 
discrimination violates the First Amendment. The District Court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a ciaim upon which relief could 
be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Noting that Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 507, and Branti v. Finkel, 445 
U. S. 507, had found that the patronage practice of discharging pubhc 
employees on the basis of their political affiliation violates the First 
Amendment, the court held that other patronage practices violate the 
Amendment only when they are the "substantial equivalent of a dis-
missal," i. e., when they would lead reasonable persons to resign. The 
court concluded, based on Wygavt v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 
U. S. 267, that rejecting an employment application did not impose a 
hardship comparable to the loss of a job. Thus, it dismissed the hiring 
claim, but remanded the others for further proceedings. 
Held: The rule of Elrod and Branti extends to promotion, transfer, recall, 
and hiring decisions based on party affiliation and support, and petition-
ers and cross-respondents have stated claims upon which relief may be 
granted. 
'Together with No. 88-2074, Freeh et al. v. Rutan et al., also on certio-
rari to the same court. 
K2.) Promotions, transfers, and recalls based on political affiliation or 
support are an impermissible infringement on public employees' First 
Amendment rights. Even though petitioners and cross-respondents 
have no legal entitlement to the promotions, transfers, and recalls, the 
government may not rely on a basis that infringes their constitutionally 
protected interests to deny them these valuable benefits. Perry v. Sin-
dermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597. Significant penalties are imposed on 
those employees who exercise their First Amendment rights. Those 
who do not compromise their beliefs stand to lose the considerable in-
creases in pay and job satisfaction attendant to promotions, the shorter 
commuting hours and lower maintenance expenses incident to transfers 
to more convenient work locations, and even the jobs themselves in the 
case of recalls. As in Elrod and Branti, these patronage practices are 
not narrowly tailored to serve vital government interests. A govern-
ment's interest in securing effective employees can be met by discharg-
ing, demoting, or transferring persons whose work is deficient, and its 
interest in securing employees who will loyally implement its policies can 
be adequately served by choosing or dismissing high-level employees on 
the basis of their political views. Likewise, the "preservation of the 
democratic process" is not furthered by these patronage decisions, since 
political parties are nurtured by other, less intrusive and equally effec-
tive methods, and since patronage decidedly impairs the elective process 
by discouraging public employees' free political expression. 
(b) The standard used by the Court of Appeals to measure alleged pa-
tronage practices in government employment is unduly restrictive be-
cause it fails to recognize that there are deprivations less harsh than 
dismissal that nevertheless press state employees and applicants to 
conform their beliefs and associations to some state-selected orthdoxy. 
ic) Patronage hiring places burdens on free speech and association 
sirr..'.ar to those imposed by patronage promotions, transfers, and recalls. 
Denial of a state job is a serious privation, since such jobs provide finan-
cial, health, and other benefits; since there may be openings with the 
State when business in the private sector is slowr; and since there are 
occupations for which the government is the sole or major employer. 
Under this Court's sustained precedent, conditioning hiring decisions 
on political belief and association plainly constitutes an unconstitutional 
condition, unless the government has a vital interest in doing so. See, 
e. g., Branti, supra, at 515-516. There is no such government interest 
here, for the same reasons that the government lacks justification for 
patronage promotions, transfers, and recalls. It is inappropriate to 
rely on Wygant to distinguish hiring from dismissal in this context, since 
that case was concerned with the least harsh means of remedying past 
wrongs and did not question that some remedy was permissible when 
there was sufficient evidence of past discrimination. Here, however, it 
is unnecessary to consider whether not being hired is less burdensome 
than being discharged, because the government is not pressed to do 
either on the basis of political affiliation. 
S68 F . 2d 943, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
B R E N N A N , J. , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which W H I T E , MAR-
SHALL. BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ . , joined. STEVENS, J., filed a con-
curring opinion. SCALIA, J. , filed a dissenting opinion in which R E H N -
QUIST. C. J. , and K E N N E D Y , J. , joined, and in which O'CONNOR, J., joined 
as to Parts II and III . 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
To :he victor belong only those spoils that may be consti-
tutionally obtained. Elrod v. Burns. 427 U. S. 347 (1976), 
and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980), decided that the 
Firs: Amendment forbids government officials to discharge 
or threaten to discharge public employees solely for not being 
supporters of the political party in power, unless party affili-
ation :s an appropriate requirement for the position involved. 
Today we are asked to decide the constitutionality of several 
related political patronage practices—whether promotion, 
transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level pub-
lic employees may be constitutionally based on party affili-
ation and support. We hold that they may not. 
I 
The petition and cross-petition before us arise from a law-
suit protesting certain employment policies and practices in-
